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Many people fall under the spell of the \gambler's fallacy," expecting outcomes in random sequences
to exhibit systematic reversals. When observing °ips of a fair coin, for example, people believe that
a streak of heads makes it more likely that the next °ip will be a tail.1 On the other hand,
people also sometimes predict that random sequences will exhibit excessive persistence rather than
reversals. While several studies have shown the belief to be fallacious, basketball fans believe that
players have signi¯cant \hot hands," being more likely to make a shot following a successful streak.2
At ¯rst blush, the hot-hand fallacy appears to directly contradict the gambler's fallacy because
it involves belief in excessive persistence rather than reversals. Several researchers have, however,
suggested that the two fallacies might be related, with the hot-hand fallacy arising as a consequence
of the gambler's fallacy.3 Consider an investor who believes that the performance of a mutual fund
is a combination of the manager's ability and luck. Convinced that luck should revert, the investor
underestimates the likelihood that a manager of average ability will exhibit a streak of above- or
below-average performances. Following good or bad streaks, therefore, the investor will over-infer
that the current manager is above or below average, and so in turn will predict continuation of
unusual performances.
In this paper we examine the relationship between the gambler's and hot-hand fallacies. We
show that an individual who is subject to the gambler's fallacy but otherwise updates rationally
tends to develop a fallacious belief in the hot hand, con¯rming the above intuition. At the same
time, our model quali¯es this intuition. We show that while the individual ends up believing in
excessive time-variation of an underlying state|e.g., ability of a fund manager|this belief does
not always lead to predictions of excessive persistence for the observable outcomes|e.g., fund
returns. Under some conditions, this belief simply o®sets the gambler's fallacy, and the individual
predicts the outcomes correctly. Under other conditions, however, predictions are incorrect, and
we characterize when they involve excessive persistence or reversals. The model and techniques we
develop provide a °exible framework for applying the gambler's fallacy to economic and ¯nance
settings.
1The gambler's fallacy is commonly interpreted as deriving from a fallacious belief in the \law of small numbers,"
namely that a small sample should resemble closely the underlying population. In coin-°ipping experiments, for
example, subjects seem to believe that heads and tails should balance even in small samples. Evidence for the gam-
bler's and law-of-small-numbers fallacies comes from experiments where subjects must predict, evaluate, or generate
random sequences, as well as from settings outside the laboratory, such as high-stakes lottery play. See Rabin (2002)
for a review of some of the evidence. In coining the term \law of small numbers," Tversky and Kahneman (1971)
relate it to the broader bias of the representativeness heuristic.
2See, for example, Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) and Tversky and Gilovich (1989a, 1989b). See also
Camerer (1989) who shows that betting markets for basketball games exhibit a small hot-hand bias.
3See, for example, Camerer (1989) and Rabin (2002). Rabin also summarizes evidence from Edwards (1961) that
suggests a causal link from the gambler's to the hot-hand fallacy.
1In Section 2 we present the model. An individual observes a sequence of signals whose proba-
bility distribution depends on an underlying state. The signal st in Period t = 1;2;:: is
st = µt + ²t;
where µt is the state and ²t an i.i.d. normal shock. For example, the signal can be interpreted as
the return on a mutual fund, the state as the ability of the fund manager, and the shock ²t as the
manager's luck in period t. We model the gambler's fallacy as the mistaken belief that the sequence
f²tgt¸1 is not i.i.d. but exhibits systematic reversals: according to the individual,




where the sequence f~ ²tgt¸1 is i.i.d. and normal, and ®;± 2 [0;1) are exogenous parameters. The
parameter ® characterizes the strength of the belief in the gambler's fallacy. When ® = 0, the
individual is an error-free Bayesian. When ® > 0, however, the individual believes that a high
realization of ²t0 for t0 < t implies a low expected realization of ²t. Thus, the investor believes that
if a fund manager was lucky in Period t0 < t, luck should reverse in Period t. The parameter ±
characterizes the memory duration of the gambler's fallacy: the smaller is ±, the more quickly the
investor believes luck should reverse. For expositional ease, from now on we follow the convention
in the literature of referring to an individual subject to the gambler's fallacy (® > 0) as \Freddy,"
and to a Bayesian (® = 0) as \Tommy."
We study Freddy's inference in environments where the state evolves according to the auto-
regressive process
µt = ¹ + ½(µt¡1 ¡ ¹) + ´t;
where ¹ is the long-run mean, ½ the persistence parameter, and ´t an i.i.d. normal shock. Suppose,
for example, that a fund is run by a team of managers. Then, µt can be interpreted as the average
ability within the team, and could change over time as managers leave or join the fund. The
parameter 1 ¡ ½ can be interpreted as the rate of managerial turnover, and the variance of ´t as
the extent of heterogeneity in managerial ability.
In Section 3 we examine how Freddy uses the sequence of past signals to make inferences about
the underlying parameters and to predict future signals. We assume that Freddy infers as a fully
rational Bayesian and fully understands the structure of his environment, except for a mistaken
and dogmatic belief that ® > 0: From observing the signals, Freddy infers both the underlying state
µt and the values of parameters of his model about which he is uncertain. For example, he can
learn about a fund-manager's ability (µt), and about the extent to which ability changes over time
2(¾2
´ ´ V ar(´t)) and is persistent (½). In fact, the case of parameter uncertainty is central to our
theory. For example, if ability is constant|i.e., ¾2
´ = 0|and Freddy knows this, then he cannot
develop a belief in the hot hand. But if Freddy initially assigns non-zero probability to ¾2
´ > 0,
we show that after a long sequence of signals he always ends up believing falsely that ¾2
´ > 0.
Moreover, this belief can lead him to predict excessive persistence of fund returns.
When Freddy is certain about all model parameters, his inference about unobservable variables
can be treated using standard tools of recursive (Kalman) ¯ltering, where the gambler's fallacy
essentially expands the state vector to include not only the state µt but also a statistic of past luck
realizations. When Freddy is initially uncertain about parameters, recursive ¯ltering can be used
to evaluate the likelihood of signals conditional on parameters. An appropriate version of the law
of large numbers then implies that after observing many signals, Freddy converges with probability
one to parameter values that maximize a limit likelihood. While the maximum likelihood when
® = 0 leads Tommy to limit posteriors corresponding to the true parameter values, Freddy's abiding
belief that ® > 0 leads him generally to false limit posteriors. Identifying when and how these limit
beliefs are wrong is the crux of our analysis.
In Section 4 we consider the case where the state is constant over time (¾2
´ = 0), and hence
signals are i.i.d. If Freddy is initially uncertain about the values of all parameters, he converges to
the false belief that ¾2
´ > 0. Freddy ends up believing, however, that the state's time-variation tends
to increase streaks of signals in a way that exactly o®sets the reversals induced by the gambler's
fallacy. As a result, he converges to the correct belief that signals are i.i.d. Consider, for example,
Freddy's predictions after a high signal. Because he believes that the state has increased, he
expects the future signals to be high and to converge back to the mean according to the persistence
parameter ½. At the same time, because he attributes the high signal partly to luck, he expects
the future signals to be low and to converge to the mean according to the memory parameter ±.
We show that Freddy ends up believing that the persistence is ~ ½ = ± ¡ ®, under which the two
convergence rates are equal and the e®ects exactly o®set.
Ironically, Freddy cannot develop a false model that o®sets his belief in the gambler's fallacy
when he knows with certainty the correct values of some parameters. For example, when he knows
that ¾2
´ = 0, he clearly cannot develop a belief in the time-varying state, so he always predicts
signals under the spell of the gambler's fallacy. This case corresponds to the experiments where
subjects know that they are dealing with fair coins.
A more interesting but less straightforward case is when Freddy knows the true value of ½ but is
uncertain about ¾2
´. For example, he might observe the turnover of fund managers but be uncertain
about whether managers di®er in ability. We show that if ½ > ± ¡ ®, then the gambler's fallacy
dominates for short streaks of signals, but the hot-hand fallacy dominates for longer streaks. That
3is, Freddy predicts a low signal following a short streak of high signals, but a high signal following a
longer streak. Intuitively, a high signal has a long-lasting impact on Freddy's estimate of the state
because when ½ is large, Freddy knows the state to be very persistent. Therefore, a long streak
of high signals has a large cumulative impact|and this belief in the increased state eventually
overtakes the gambler's fallacy, leading Freddy to predict a high signal. This result seems to re°ect
the intuition of previous researchers that the hot-hand fallacy arises when believers in the gambler's
fallacy attempt to rationalize long streaks. Note, however, that the opposite result is possible: if
½ < ± ¡ ®, then a long streak of signals leads Freddy to expect a large cumulative reversal of luck.
Thus, the intuition is correct in our model only under the (perhaps plausible) assumption that
individuals believe the state to be persistent, but expect luck to reverse quickly.
In Section 5 we consider the case where signals are serially correlated. We show that unlike the
i.i.d. case, Freddy cannot predict the signals correctly even when he is initially uncertain about the
values of all parameters. The intuition is that in the i.i.d. case, Freddy gets around the gambler's
fallacy by taking the state's persistence to be ~ ½ = ± ¡ ® rather than the true value ½. When the
state is time-varying, the persistence parameter in°uences the signal process, and a discrepancy
between ~ ½ and ½ leads Freddy to incorrect predictions.
Freddy's prediction errors turn out not to depend on the comparison between ½ and ± ¡ ®:
he always under-predicts the next signal after a short streak of high signals, over-predicts after a
longer streak, and under-predicts again after a very long streak. The intuition is easier to see when
½ > ± ¡ ®, i.e., Freddy expects luck to reverse quickly and yet sees highly persistent signals. To
explain the absence of quick reversals, Freddy believes that shocks to the state are large but short-
lived. Thus, he underestimates the persistence parameter, converging to a value ~ ½ between ± ¡ ®
and ½. Because ~ ½ > ±¡®, Freddy's estimate of the state after a long streak overtakes the gambler's
fallacy, which is why the initial under-prediction is followed by over-prediction. The subsequent
under-prediction is because Freddy underestimates the state's persistence, and does not update as
much as Tommy after a very long streak.4 In generating over-prediction, our model shows that the
hot-hand fallacy can arise even when individuals infer the persistence parameter from the data.
In that case, however, there must be true serial correlation, and under-prediction after very long
streaks.
Our model derives a number of implications from the single psychological bias of the gambler's
4The intuition when ½ < ± ¡ ® is somewhat di®erent. In that case, Freddy expects luck to reverse slowly, and
the positive correlation in the signals is mainly in the short run. To explain the absence of slow reversals, Freddy
overestimates the persistence parameter, converging to a value ~ ½ between ½ and ±¡®. Because ±¡® exceeds ~ ½ and ½,
the gambler's fallacy overtakes any updating on the state after a very long streak, thus generating under-prediction.
The e®ects of the gambler's fallacy are weaker after shorter streaks, and Freddy over-predicts relative to Tommy
because he overestimates the state's persistence. Finally, the initial under-prediction is because Tommy updates
heavily after short streaks due to the high short-run correlation in the signals.
4fallacy and provides a °exible framework for studying further implications.5 In fact, we conclude
this paper in Section 6 by sketching some potential applications of the model. An intriguing broad
implication is that people might end up believing in predictability even in i.i.d. environments.
Thus, even when asset returns are i.i.d., investors might be willing to pay for information about
past market movements, or hire ¯nancial experts who are assumed to observe these movements.
This could help explain why people invest in actively-managed funds in spite of the evidence that
these funds do not outperform the market. Our model could also speak to other ¯nance puzzles
such as the equity-premium puzzle or the momentum/reversals in stock returns.
2 The Model
We assume that an individual observes a sequence of signals whose probability distribution depends
on an underlying state. The signal st in Period t = 1;2;:: is
st = µt + ²t; (1)
where µt is the state and ²t is an i.i.d. normal shock with mean zero and variance ¾2
² > 0. The
state evolves according to the auto-regressive process
µt = ¹ + ½(µt¡1 ¡ ¹) + ´t; (2)
where ½ 2 [0;1) is the reversion rate to the long-run mean ¹, and ´t is an i.i.d. normal shock with
mean zero, variance ¾2
´, and independent of ²t. The signal can be interpreted, for example, as the
return on a mutual fund, the state as the fund manager's ability, the shock ²t as the manager's luck,
and the parameter ½ as the extent to which ability is persistent. Alternatively, if the fund consists of
multiple managers with heterogeneous abilities, 1¡½ can be interpreted as the managerial turnover.
We model the gambler's fallacy as the mistaken belief that the sequence f²tgt¸1 is not i.i.d.,
5The tractability and applicability of our model is an important advantage over Rabin's (2002) related model of
the law of small numbers. In Rabin, Freddy draws from an urn with replacement but believes falsely that the urn is
replenished only every odd period. Thus, the law of small numbers applies every even period. Our model eliminates
the arti¯cial distinction between odd and even periods, allows all variables to be continuous rather than two-valued,
and characterizes beliefs explicitly for general sequences of signals. More importantly, by allowing for a time-varying
state our model is suitable for analyzing the hot-hand fallacy, which involves precisely a belief in the state's time-
variation. Our work is also related to the theory of momentum and reversals in Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
In BSV, individuals observe a random walk but believe incorrectly that innovations are drawn either from a regime
with excess reversals or from one with excess streaks. If the reversal regime is the more common, individuals under-
react to short streaks because they expect a reversal. They over-react, however, to longer streaks because they take
them as sign of a switch to the streak regime. To provide a psychological foundation for their assumptions, BSV
appeal to a combination of biases: the conservatism bias for the reversal regime and the representativeness bias for the
streak regime. Our model, by contrast, not only derives such biases from the single underlying bias of the gambler's
fallacy, but in doing so provides predictions as to which biases are the more relevant in di®erent informational settings.
5but exhibits systematic reversals. More speci¯cally, we assume that according to the individual,




where the shocks ~ ²t are i.i.d. and normal with mean zero and variance ~ ¾2
², and ®;± 2 [0;1) are
exogenous parameters.6 The parameter ® characterizes the strength of the belief in the gambler's
fallacy. When ® = 0, the individual is an error-free Bayesian (Tommy) treating the sequence
f²tgt¸1 correctly as i.i.d.. When ® > 0, however, the individual (Freddy) has the wrong model
of how signals are generated. To see how this corresponds to the gambler's fallacy, we take the





If Freddy believes that all shocks up to t ¡ 1 have been positive, then he expects the shock ²t to
be negative because ® > 0 and ± ¸ 0. Thus, consistent with the gambler's fallacy, Freddy believes
that if a fund manager was lucky up to Period t ¡ 1, luck should reverse in Period t.
The parameter ± characterizes the memory duration of the gambler's fallacy. When ± = 0,
Freddy believes that the shock ²t ought to counteract only the shock in Period t ¡ 1. By contrast,
when ± is close to one, Freddy believes that ²t ought to counteract the average of all past shocks.
The size of ± relative to ® a®ects the precise manifestation of the gambler's fallacy, as shown in the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 Freddy's expectation as of Period t ¡ 1 of a future shock is




Lemma 1 generalizes Equation (4) to Freddy's prediction of all future shocks rather than only
²t. Suppose that Freddy believes that all shocks up to t ¡ 1 have been positive. When ± > ®,
he expects all future shocks to be negative, in line with the gambler's fallacy. By contrast, when
± < ®, he expects future shocks to follow an oscillating pattern: the shock in Period t will be
negative to compensate for the positive shocks up to t¡1, the shock in Period t+1 will be positive
to compensate for the negative shock in Period t, and so on. In the intermediate case ± = ®, the
gambler's fallacy lasts exactly one period: Freddy expects the shock in Period t to be negative and
all future shocks to be zero on average.7
6We set ²t = 0 for t · 0, so that all terms in the in¯nite sum are well de¯ned.
7Intuitively, su±cient memory rules out oscillation by preventing the predicted counter-shocks from looming too
6To our knowledge, the issue of whether the gambler's fallacy generates oscillatory patterns
has not been raised in the psychology literature. Because such patterns seem somewhat counter-
intuitive, however, we focus on the case ± ¸ ® in the remainder of this paper. Appendix A contains
a brief discussion of the case ± < ®.
Notice that we are allowing Freddy to perceive correctly the sequence f´tgt¸1 as i.i.d. Thus,
we are assuming that the gambler's fallacy applies to the relationship between the signals and the
underlying states (i.e., the sequence f²tgt¸1), but not to the relationship between the states and
their long-run average. Since signals are observable but states are not, the former relationship
represents an aspect of randomness that is more salient to Freddy, and perhaps more conducive to
biases. But although we ¯nd the gambler's fallacy more compelling for f²tgt¸1, our formalism can
easily cover the case where the fallacy applies also to f´tgt¸1. We sketch this extension in Appendix
A and show that most of our results carry through.
A ¯nal note concerning our model is in order. While to our knowledge, the gambler's fallacy is
discussed in the psychology literature solely in i.i.d. environments (e.g., coin °ips), we are applying
it to environments that are potentially not i.i.d. We believe that doing so in a psychologically
compelling way is important for understanding the fallacy's implications. Indeed, our derivation of
the hot-hand fallacy from the gambler's fallacy involves agents coming to believe (perhaps wrongly)
that the environment is not i.i.d.. This requires a theory of how the gambler's fallacy would manifest
itself in such environments. Moreover, in many economic and ¯nance applications of our model, it
is reasonable to assume that the true environment is not i.i.d.
3 Freddy Infers
In this section we formulate Freddy's inference problem, and establish some general results that
serve as the basis for the more speci¯c results of Sections 4 and 5. The inference problem consists
in using the signals to learn about the underlying state µt, and possibly about the parameters of the
model. Freddy's model is characterized by the variance ¾2
´ of the shocks to the state, the persistence
½, the variance ~ ¾2
² of the noise in the signal (where the noise refers to the shocks ~ ²t rather than ²t),
the long-run mean ¹, and the gambler's fallacy parameters (®;±). We assume that Freddy does
not question his belief in the gambler's fallacy, i.e., has a dogmatic point prior on (®;±). He can,
however, learn about the other parameters. From now on, we reserve the notation (¾2
´;½;¹) for the
true parameter values, and denote generic values by (~ ¾2
´; ~ ½; ~ ¹). Thus, Freddy can learn about the
parameter vector ~ p ´ (~ ¾2
´; ~ ½; ~ ¾2
²; ~ ¹).
large relative to the initial shock as to force predictions back in the other direction.
73.1 No Parameter Uncertainty
We start our analysis with the case where Freddy is certain about all model parameters. This case
is relatively simple and serves as an input for the parameter-uncertainty case. Freddy's inference
problem can be formulated as one of recursive (Kalman) ¯ltering. Recursive ¯ltering is a technique
for solving inference problems where (i) inference concerns a \state vector" evolving according to
a stochastic process, (ii) a noisy signal of the state vector is observed in each period, (iii) the
stochastic structure is linear and normal.8
To formulate the recursive-¯ltering problem, we must de¯ne the state vector, the equation
according to which the state vector evolves, and the equation linking the state vector to the signal.
The state vector must include not only the state µt, but also some measure of the past realizations of
luck since according to Freddy luck reverses predictably. It turns out that all past luck realizations
can be condensed into an one-dimensional statistic. This statistic can be appended to the state
µt, and therefore, recursive ¯ltering can be used even in the presence of the gambler's fallacy. We
de¯ne the state vector as
xt ´
h










and v0 denotes the transpose of the vector v. Equations (2) and (3) imply that the state vector
evolves according to





0 ± ¡ ®
¸
and
wt ´ [´t;~ ²t]0:
Equations (1)-(3) imply that the signal is related to the state vector through
st = ~ ¹ + Cxt¡1 + vt; (6)
8For textbooks on recursive ¯ltering see, for example, Anderson and Moore (1979) and Balakrishnan (1987). We
are using the somewhat cumbersome term \state vector" because we are reserving the term \state" for µt, and the
two concepts di®er in our model.
8where
C ´ [~ ½;¡®]
and vt ´ ´t + ~ ²t. To start the recursion, we must specify Freddy's prior beliefs for the initial state
x0. We denote the mean and variance of µ0 by µ0 and ¾2
µ;0, respectively. Since ²t = 0 for t · 0, the
mean and variance of ²±
0 are both zero. Proposition 1 determines Freddy's beliefs about the state
in Period t, conditional on the history of signals Ht ´ fst0gt0=1;::;t up to that period.
Proposition 1 Conditional on Ht, xt is normal with mean xt given recursively by
xt = Axt¡1 + Gt [st ¡ ~ ¹ ¡ Cxt¡1]; x0 = [µ0 ¡ ~ ¹;0]0; (7)
and covariance matrix §t given recursively by





















t), W ´ E(wtw0
t), and U ´ E(vtwt).
Freddy's conditional expectation evolves according to Equation (7). This is simply a regression
equation: the state vector in Period t is regressed on that period's signal, conditional on the history
up to Period t ¡ 1. The regression coe±cient Gt depends on Freddy's conditional variance of the
state §t¡1. Proposition 2 shows that when t goes to 1, this variance converges to a limit that is
independent of the initial value §0.
Proposition 2 Limt!1§t = §, where § is the unique solution in the set of positive matrices of







¤0 + W: (10)
Proposition 2 implies that there is convergence to a steady state where the conditional variance








and the conditional expectation of the state vector xt evolves according to a linear equation with
constant coe±cients. The steady state plays an important role in our analysis: it is also the limit in
the case of parameter uncertainty because Freddy eventually becomes certain about the parameter
9values. In Sections 4 and 5 we rely on the steady state when, for example, considering the e®ect
of a signal on Freddy's future predictions. The linearity result of Proposition 1 implies that the
e®ect is deterministic and independent of the history of past signals. The convergence result of
Proposition 2 implies that the e®ect is time-independent.
3.2 Parameter Uncertainty
We next allow Freddy to be uncertain about the parameters of his model. Parameter uncertainty is
a natural assumption in many settings. For example, Freddy might be uncertain about the extent
to which the ability of fund managers varies over time (¾2
´) or is persistent (½). Alternatively, under
the managerial-turnover interpretation, Freddy might be unsure about whether managers di®er in
ability.
Because parameter uncertainty eliminates the normality that is necessary for recursive ¯ltering,
Freddy's inference problem threatens to be less tractable. Recursive ¯ltering can, however, be
used as part of a two-stage procedure. In a ¯rst stage, we ¯x each model parameter to a given
value, and compute the likelihood of a history of signals conditional on these values. Because the
conditional probability distribution is normal, the likelihood can be computed using the recursive-
¯ltering formulas of Section 3.1. In a second stage, we combine the likelihood with Freddy's prior
beliefs, through Bayes' law, and determine Freddy's posteriors on the parameters. We show, in
particular, that Freddy's limit posteriors when t goes to 1 can be derived by maximizing a limit
likelihood over all possible parameter values.
We assume that Freddy's prior beliefs over parameter vectors ~ p ´ (~ ¾2
´; ~ ½; ~ ¾2
²; ~ ¹) have support P,
and to avoid technicalities, we restrict P to be ¯nite. We denote by ¼0(~ p) Freddy's prior probability
of ~ p. As we show below, ¼0(~ p) a®ects Freddy's limit posteriors only through its support.
The likelihood function Lt(Htj~ p) associated to a parameter vector ~ p and history Ht = fst0gt0=1;::;t
is the probability density of observing the signals conditional on ~ p. From Bayes' law, this density
is
Lt(Htj~ p) = Lt(s1 ¢¢¢stj~ p) =
t Y
t0=1




where `t(stjHt¡1; ~ p) denotes the density of st conditional on ~ p and Ht¡1. The latter density can be
computed using the recursive-¯ltering formulas of Section 3.1. Indeed, Proposition 1 shows that
conditional on ~ p and Ht¡1, xt¡1 is normal. Since st is a linear function of xt¡1, it is also normal
10with a mean and variance that we denote by st(~ p) and ¾2
s;t(~ p), respectively. Thus:






























Freddy's posterior beliefs over parameter vectors can be derived from his prior beliefs and the




~ p02P ¼0(~ p0)Lt(Htj~ p0)
: (13)
To determine Freddy's posterior beliefs in the limit when t goes to 1, we need to determine the
asymptotic behavior of the likelihood function Lt(Htj~ p). Intuitively, this behavior depends on how
well Freddy can ¯t the data (i.e., the history of signals) using the model corresponding to ~ p. To
evaluate the ¯t of a model, we consider the true model according to which the data are generated.
The true model is characterized by ® = 0 and the true parameters p ´ (¹;½;¾2
´;¾2
²). We denote by
s¤
t and ¾¤2
s;t, respectively, the true mean and variance of st conditional on Ht¡1, and by P¤ and E¤,





















´ F(~ p) (14)
almost surely, where
¾2









e(~ p) ´ lim
t!1
E¤ [s¤
t ¡ st(~ p)]
2 :
Theorem 1 implies that the likelihood function is asymptotically equal to
Lt(Htj~ p) » exp[tF(~ p)];
thus growing exponentially at the rate F(~ p). Note that F(~ p) does not depend on the speci¯c
history Ht of signals, and is thus deterministic. That the likelihood function becomes deterministic
for large t follows from the law of large numbers, which is the main result that we need to prove the
11theorem. The appropriate large-numbers law in our setting is one applying to non-independent and
non-identically distributed random variables. Non-independence is because the expected values s¤
t
and st(~ p) involve the entire history of past signals, and non-identical distributions are because at
any ¯nite time we are not at the steady state.
The growth rate F(~ p) can be interpreted as the ¯t of the model corresponding to ~ p. A straight-
forward corollary of Theorem 1 is that when t goes to 1, Freddy gives positive probability only to
values of ~ p that maximize F(~ p) over the set P. We denote the set of these values by m(P).
Corollary 1 If ~ p = 2 m(P) ´ argmax~ p2PF(~ p), then limt!1 ¼t(~ p) = 0 almost surely.
To solve the ¯t-maximization problem, we ignore discreteness issues from now on and allow the
set P to be continuous. Proposition 3 characterizes the solution to the problem.
Proposition 3 Suppose that P satis¯es the cone property
(~ ¾2
´; ~ ½; ~ ¾2
²; ~ ¹) 2 P ) (¸~ ¾2
´; ~ ½;¸~ ¾2
²; ~ ¹) 2 P; 8¸ > 0:
Then, ~ p 2 m(P) if and only if
1. e(~ p) = min~ p02P e(~ p0) ´ e(P)
2. ¾2
s(~ p) = ¾¤2
s + e(~ p).
The characterization of Proposition 3 is very intuitive. The function e(~ p) is the expected squared
di®erence between the true conditional mean of st, and the mean that Freddy computes under the
model corresponding to ~ p. Thus, e(~ p) measures the error in Freddy's predictions relative to those
of the true model, and a model maximizing the ¯t must minimize this error.
A model maximizing the ¯t must also generate the right measure of uncertainty about the
future signals. Freddy's uncertainty under the model corresponding to ~ p is measured by ¾2
s(~ p), the
conditional variance of st. This must equal to the true error in Freddy's predictions, which is the
sum of two orthogonal components: the error e(~ p) relative to the predictions of the true model,
and the error in the true model's predictions, i.e., the true conditional variance ¾¤2
s .
The cone property in Proposition 3 ensures that in maximizing the ¯t, there is no con°ict
between minimizing e(~ p) and setting ¾2
s(~ p) = ¾¤2
s + e(~ p). Indeed, e(~ p) depends on ~ ¾2
´ and ~ ¾2
² only
through their ratio ~ s2
´ ´ ~ ¾2
´=~ ¾2
² because only ~ s2
´ a®ects the vector G of regression coe±cients. The
cone property ensures that given any feasible ratio ~ s2
´, we can scale ~ ¾2
´ and ~ ¾2
² to make ¾2
s(~ p) equal
12to ¾¤2
s + e(~ p). The cone property is satis¯ed, in particular, when the set P includes all parameter
values:
P = P0 ´
©
(~ ¾2
´; ~ ½; ~ ¾2
²; ~ ¹) : ~ ¾2
´ 2 R+; ~ ½ 2 [0;1); ~ ¾2
² 2 R+; ~ ¹ 2 R
ª
:
Maximizing the ¯t is potentially complicated. Indeed, the function e(~ p) depends on the vector G
of regression coe±cients, which in turn depends on ~ p in a complicated fashion through the recursive-
¯ltering formulas of Section 3.1. In the Appendix (Lemma 4), however, we derive an expression for
e(~ p) that we can easily minimize numerically. Moreover, in Sections 4 and 5 we derive closed-form
characterizations of the solution to the minimization problem when Freddy is close to rational (®
small).
We conclude this section by determining Tommy's limit posteriors. We examine, in particular,
whether Tommy converges to the true parameter values when he initially entertains all values, i.e.,
P = P0. Since Tommy is a Bayesian, his limit posteriors solve the ¯t-maximization problem for
® = 0.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ® = 0.
² If ¾2




´ = 0 or ½ = 0, then m(P0) =
½
(~ ¾2
´; ~ ½; ~ ¾2
²;¹) : [~ ¾2





´ + ~ ¾2
² = ¾2
´ + ¾2
²; ~ ½ = 0]
¾
.
Proposition 4 shows that Tommy converges to the true parameter values if ¾2
´ > 0 and ½ > 0.
If ¾2
´ = 0 or ½ = 0, however, then he remains undecided between the true model and a set of
other models. The intuition is that when the state is constant over time (¾2
´ = 0) or not persistent
(½ = 0), signals are i.i.d., and Tommy cannot identify which of the two parameters is zero. Of
course, Tommy's failure to converge to the true model is inconsequential because all models that
he converges to predict correctly that signals are i.i.d.
4 Independent Signals
In this section we consider Freddy's inference problem when the signals are i.i.d. As pointed out in
the previous section, i.i.d. signals can be generated when the state is constant over time (¾2
´ = 0)
or not persistent (½ = 0). We ¯rst study Freddy's \free-form" inference when he initially entertains
all parameter values (P = P0). We next allow for prior knowledge, i.e., assume that Freddy knows
with certainty the true values of some parameters.
134.1 No Prior Knowledge
Proposition 5 characterizes Freddy's convergent beliefs.
Proposition 5 Suppose that ® > 0, and ¾2
´ = 0 or ½ = 0. Then m(P0) consists of the two elements
~ p1 ´
µ


















~ p2 ´ (¾2
´ + ¾2
²;0;0;¹):
Moreover, e(P0) = 0.
Since e(P0) = 0, Freddy ends up predicting the signals correctly despite being subject to the
gambler's fallacy. To explain the intuition for this surprising result, consider the models that










> 0) and persistence (since ~ ½ = ± ¡ ® ¸ 0). While this belief is
obviously erroneous, it exactly o®sets the erroneous belief in the gambler's fallacy. Indeed, consider
the impact of a high signal in Period t on Freddy's forecast of the subsequent signals. Because
of the linearity of our model, we can characterize the impact simply by considering a marginal
increase in the Period t signal.
Lemma 2 In steady state,
dEt(st0)
dst
= CAt0¡t¡1G = ~ ½t0¡tG1 ¡ ®(± ¡ ®)t0¡t¡1G2;
where G1 and G2 are the components of the regression-coe±cient vector G, and t0 > t.
Following a unit increase in the Period t signal, Freddy believes that the state has increased by
the regression coe±cient G1. He then expects the signal in Period t0 > t to be higher by ~ ½t0¡tG1
because the state reverts to its long-run mean at the rate ~ ½k. This belief in the time-varying state
is counteracted by the gambler's fallacy which corresponds to the term ®(± ¡ ®)t0¡t¡1G2. Freddy
attributes the high signal in Period t partly to luck through the regression coe±cient G2. He then
expects the future signals to be lower because luck reverses. As shown in Lemma 1, this e®ect
decays over time at the rate (± ¡ ®)k.
Since Freddy converges to the persistence parameter ~ ½ = ± ¡®, the two erroneous beliefs decay
at the same rate. Therefore, they cancel each other if they have the same amplitude. This occurs
14when the ratio ~ s2
´ ´ ~ ¾2
´=~ ¾2
², which controls the relative size of the regression coe±cients G1 and G2,
takes the value in Proposition 5.
Freddy's erroneous belief in the time-varying state resembles to a hot-hand fallacy: Freddy
believes that the state varies in a serially correlated manner while in fact it is constant. This
belief, however, does not constitute a hot-hand fallacy in the conventional sense because it does not
manifest itself in the predictions of the signals, being o®set by the gambler's fallacy. Freddy can
be thought of, for example, as a basketball fan convinced that a player is going through hot and
cold periods that are exactly o®set by quick reversals of luck. If the player makes a shot, Freddy
thinks, then probably his skill level is temporarily heightened - but having made a shot also means
(even as a hot player) that he is \due" for a miss.
The second model that Freddy converges to is simpler than the ¯rst. Under this model, the state
µt exhibits no persistence (since ~ ½ = 0) and is equal to the signal (since ~ ¾2
² = 0). Freddy then treats
the state as i.i.d., and predicts correctly i.i.d. signals. Note, however, that the success of this model
relies on the assumption that the gambler's fallacy does not apply to the relationship between the
states and their long-run mean (i.e., Freddy treats the sequence f´tgt¸1 correctly as i.i.d.). One
motivation for this assumption, given in Section 2, is that this relationship is not observable. When
the signal is equal to the state, however, the relationship becomes observable and the plausibility
of the assumption is stretched. In Appendix A we show that when the gambler's fallacy applies to
both f²tgt¸1 and f´tgt¸1, Freddy can only converge to a model very similar to the ¯rst model of
Proposition 5.
Note that under both models of Proposition 5, Freddy converges to the true long-run mean
¹. This result is general, holding also for serially correlated signals as shown in Section 5. The
intuition is that the long-run mean determines the average value of the signal, and inferring this
average can be separated from inferring properties of the °uctuations around the average.
4.2 Prior Knowledge
The possibility that Freddy can develop a belief in the time-varying state that o®sets the gambler's
fallacy relies crucially on the unrestricted nature of his priors. For example, under the ¯rst model
of Proposition 5, both ~ ¾2
´ and ~ ½ di®er from their true values ¾2
´ and ½ (except in the knife-edge
case where ½ = ± ¡ ®). Therefore, if Freddy knows with certainty what the true values are, then
he cannot converge to that model. In other words, more knowledge can hurt Freddy because it
reduces his °exibility to come up with the incorrect model that o®sets the gambler's fallacy.
The most straightforward example of prior knowledge is when Freddy is aware that the state
is constant (¾2
´ = 0). The prototypical occurrence of this is when people observe the °ips of a coin
15they know is fair. The state can then be de¯ned as the probability of heads or tails, and it is known
and constant.
When Freddy knows that ¾2
´ = 0, he obviously cannot develop a belief in the time-varying
state. Therefore, his predictions are in°uenced only by the gambler's fallacy. This is consistent
with the experimental evidence: when, for example, subjects know that they are dealing with fair
coins they tend to predict reversals. Of course, our model matches the evidence by construction,
but we believe that this is a strength of our approach (in taking the gambler's fallacy as a primitive
bias and examining whether the hot-hand fallacy can follow as an implication). Indeed, one could
argue that the hot-hand fallacy is a primitive bias, either unconnected to the gambler's fallacy or
perhaps even generating it. But then, one would have to explain why such a primitive bias does
not arise in experiments involving fair coins.
The hot-hand fallacy tends to arise in settings where people are uncertain about the mechanism
generating the data, and where a belief in serially correlated variation is plausible a priori. Such
settings are common when human skill is involved. For example, it is plausible - and often true -
that the performance of a basketball player can °uctuate systematically over time because of mood,
well-being, etc. Consistent with the evidence, our approach can generate the hot-hand fallacy in
such settings. Indeed, we show below that Freddy's predictions can exhibit excessive persistence
precisely when he allows for the possibility that the state can vary in a serially correlated manner,
i.e., ¾2
´ > 0 and ½ > 0.
We next consider an example where Freddy's prior knowledge does not rule out serially corre-
lated variation in the state. We assume that the state is constant, and that while Freddy is unsure
about this, he knows the persistence parameter ½ > 0. This example involves an assumption about
counterfactuals: if the state did °uctuate (which it does not), it would be persistent, and Freddy
knows what the persistence is. To motivate the example, we return to the managerial-turnover
interpretation of our model. Suppose that a mutual-fund's performance is determined by the av-
erage ability within the team of its managers, each manager's ability is constant over time, and a
fraction of managers turn over in each period. Then, the state is time-varying if managers di®er
in ability because turnover can alter the average ability within the team. Suppose that in reality
all managers are identical but Freddy is unsure about this. Freddy could, however, observe the
turnover, in which case he knows with con¯dence what the state's persistence would be if there is
time-variation. Proposition 6 characterizes Freddy's convergent beliefs:
Proposition 6 Suppose that ® > 0, ¾2





´; ~ ½; ~ ¾2
²; ~ ¹) : ~ ¾2
´ 2 R+; ~ ½ = ½; ~ ¾2
² 2 R+; ~ ¹ 2 R
ª
:
16Then, any element of m(P½) satis¯es ~ ¾2
´ > 0, ~ ¾2
² > 0, and ~ ¹ = ¹. Moreover, e(P½) = 0 only when
½ = ± ¡ ®.
Freddy ends up predicting the signals correctly (e(P½) = 0) only in the knife-edge case where
½ = ± ¡®. Indeed, recall that in the absence of prior knowledge, Freddy gets around the gambler's
fallacy by assuming that the state is time-varying with persistence parameter ~ ½ = ± ¡ ®. This
belief is consistent with the prior knowledge of ½ only when ½ = ± ¡ ®. When ½ 6= ± ¡ ®, Freddy
still develops a belief in the time-varying state (~ ¾2
´ > 0) to explain why the signals do not exhibit
systematic reversals. This belief, however, cannot fully o®set the gambler's fallacy. Note that
Freddy always converges to the true long-run mean ¹.
To sharpen our characterization of Freddy's convergent beliefs, we consider the case where he
is close to rational, i.e., ® is small. Proposition 7 determines the convergent beliefs in closed form.
Proposition 7 Suppose that ¾2























Proposition 7 implies that when ® is small, Freddy ends up believing that the variance of the
shocks to the state is ~ ¾2
´ ¼ ®z¾2
². Using this result, we can characterize Freddy's errors in predicting
the signals. We examine, in particular, how Freddy predicts a signal that follows a streak of similar
signals. We assume that the streak is between Periods t and t0 ¡1, and all signals in the streak are
identical.
Proposition 8 Suppose that ® is small, ¾2
´ = 0, ½ > 0, and Freddy considers parameter values in





is negative for t0 = t + 1 and becomes positive as t0 increases. If ½ < ±, then the opposite is true.
When ½ > ±, Freddy predicts a low signal following a short streak of high signals, but a high
signal following a longer streak. Thus, the gambler's fallacy dominates for short streaks but the
17hot-hand fallacy dominates for longer ones. Intuitively, a high signal has a long-lasting impact
on Freddy's estimate of the state because when ½ is large, Freddy knows the state to be very
persistent. Therefore, a long streak of high signals has a large cumulative impact|and this belief
in the increased state eventually overtakes the gambler's fallacy, leading Freddy to predict a high
signal. At the same time, Freddy cannot predict a high signal after any streak of high signals
because he would then be overcompensating for the gambler's fallacy: by adopting a smaller value
of ~ ¾2
´, he would hold a weaker belief in positive correlation, and his predictions would match the
i.i.d. signals more closely. Therefore, the gambler's fallacy must dominate for short streaks. The
results are reversed when ½ < ±: the gambler's fallacy dominates for long streaks because Freddy
believes in a large cumulative reversal of luck, and the hot-hand fallacy appears after short streaks.
Proposition 8 makes use of the closed-form solutions derived for small ®. For general ®, the ¯t-
maximization problem can be solved through a simple numerical algorithm. The numerical results
con¯rm the Proposition, with ± ¡ ® taking the place of ±.
Summarizing, when signals are i.i.d., our model con¯rms the intuition of previous researchers
that the hot-hand fallacy can arise as a consequence of the gambler's fallacy. At the same time,
we qualify this intuition in important ways. We ¯nd that the hot-hand fallacy can arise only
when individuals have strong priors on the state's persistence but are open to learning about time-
variation. We also show that the hot-hand fallacy does not always appear after long streaks: this
requires the additional assumption that individuals expect the state to be persistent but luck to
reverse quickly. Finally, we show that the endogenous belief in the hot hand cannot be so strong
to always dominate the gambler's fallacy: otherwise individuals could improve their predictions by
adopting a weaker such belief.
5 Serially Correlated Signals
In this section we consider Freddy's inference problem when the signals are serially correlated.
Serial correlation arises when the state varies over time (¾2
´ > 0) and is persistent (½ > 0). To
highlight the new e®ects relative to the i.i.d. case, we assume that Freddy is initially uncertain
about the values of all parameters. Proposition 9 shows that unlike the i.i.d. case, Freddy can
predict the signals correctly only when ½ = ± ¡ ®.
Proposition 9 Suppose that ® > 0, ¾2
´ > 0, and ½ > 0. Then, e(P0) = 0 only when ½ = ± ¡ ®.
The intuition is that in the i.i.d. case, Freddy gets around the gambler's fallacy by taking the
state's persistence to be ~ ½ = ± ¡ ® rather than the true value ½. When the state is time-varying,
the persistence parameter in°uences the signal process, and a discrepancy between ~ ½ and ½ leads
18Freddy to incorrect predictions. Formally, consider the impact of a high signal in Period t on
Freddy's forecast of the subsequent signals. From Lemma 2, this is
dEt(st0)
dst
= ~ ½t0¡tG1 ¡ ®(± ¡ ®)t0¡t¡1G2: (16)
In the i.i.d. case, Freddy's predictions are correct because this expression can be made equal to
zero for all t0 > t, by setting ~ ½ = ± ¡ ®. When signals are serially correlated, the same expression







1 > 0 because the state is time-varying. Equality is possible only in the knife-edge case
where ½ = ± ¡ ®. Thus, although Freddy can develop a model that gets him around the gambler's
fallacy when signals are i.i.d., this is not feasible in a more complicated environment.
To determine Freddy's convergent beliefs when ½ 6= ±¡®, we consider the case where he is close
to rational, i.e., ® is small. As in Section 4, this case allows for closed-form solutions that convey
the main intuitions. In addition to ®, we take the variance ¾2
´ of the shocks to the state to be
small, meaning that signals are close to i.i.d. Formally, we assume that both ® and ¾2
´ converge to
zero, holding their ratio constant, and we set ! ´ ¾2
´=(®¾2
²).9 As we explain later in this section,
our closed-form results are consistent with the numerical solutions derived in the general case.
When Freddy is close to rational, he converges to a model that generates predictions close
to the true model's. Freddy might not, however, converge to the correct belief that the state is
almost constant (¾2
´ small). Indeed, recall that i.i.d signals are generated either because the state is
constant (¾2
´ = 0) or not persistent (½ = 0). Therefore, when Freddy predicts that signals are close
to i.i.d., this might be because he converges to a model where ~ ½, and not ~ ¾2
´, is small. Under this
model, Freddy treats the state as approximately i.i.d. (~ ½ small) and the signal as approximately
equal to the state (~ ¾2
² small). This model is, in fact, similar to the second model of Proposition 5 that
gets around the gambler's fallacy by taking the sequence f~ ²tgt¸1 to have zero variance. Condition








1 ¡ ±2 (18)
9The case where ¾
2
´ remains constant when ® goes to zero can be derived by setting ! = 1 in our solutions, but
the case ! < 1 is the more interesting.
19or
!½2p
1 ¡ ±2 >
¡
1 ¡ ½2¢ 3
2 : (19)
The intuition behind Condition 1 is that the small-~ ½ model does a good job in getting around
the gambler's fallacy but a poor one in explaining the serially correlated signals. Therefore, it is
dominated by the small-~ ¾2
´ model when the serial correlation is signi¯cant, which occurs when ¾2
´
and ½ are large. Condition 1 is indeed satis¯ed (through Equation (18)) when ½ is larger than ±,
and also when it is not much smaller. It is also satis¯ed (through Equation (19)) for any value of
½ when the ratio ! ´ ¾2
´=(®¾2
²) is large enough. We assume Condition 1 from now on because the
small-~ ½ model seems somewhat unappealing: its success relies heavily on the assumption that the
gambler's fallacy does not apply to the sequence f´tgt¸1. Proposition 10 solves the ¯t-maximization
problem.
Proposition 10 Suppose that ¾2
´ > 0, ½ > 0, and Condition 1 is met. When ® and ¾2
´ converge
























r(1 ¡ ½2)(1 ¡ ½r)
(20)





(1 ¡ ½2)(1 ¡ ½r)
2 = 0: (21)
Equation (21) implies that r is between ½ and ±. Therefore, when ® and ¾2
´ are small, Freddy
converges over time to a persistence parameter ~ ½ that is between the true value ½ and the memory
parameter ±. Consider, for example, the case where ½ > ±, i.e., Freddy expects luck to reverse
quickly and yet sees highly persistent signals. To explain the absence of quick reversals, Freddy
believes that shocks to the state are large but short-lived. Thus, he underestimates the persistence,
tilting ~ ½ towards the value ± that characterizes the speed of the reversals. Of course, he tilts ~ ½ only
partially towards ± because he must also account for the true persistence of the observed signals.
In the opposite case where ½ < ±, Freddy overestimates the persistence to explain the absence of
slow reversals.
Proposition 10 implies that when ® and ¾2
´ are small, Freddy believes that the variance of the
shocks to the state is ~ ¾2
´ ¼ ®z¾2
² = (z=!)¾2
´. One might expect the ratio z=! to be greater than
20one because the gambler's fallacy can lead Freddy to overestimate the state's time-variation. When
½ > ±, z=! is indeed greater than one, and so is the ratio
z(1¡½2)
!(1¡r2). Thus, Freddy overestimates
both the variance of the shocks to the state (~ ¾2
´ > ¾2







1¡½2). Somewhat surprisingly, however, Freddy can underestimate both variances when ½
is su±ciently smaller than ±. Indeed, when ½ < ±, Freddy overestimates the state's persistence, and
this can compensate for the gambler's fallacy more e®ectively than overestimating the variance.
The intuition for the above results, and for some of the subsequent ones, can be seen through a
graphical representation of the ¯t-maximization problem. In the proof of Proposition 10 we show
that the error e(~ p) is approximately equal to
















² and ~ s2
´ ´ ~ ¾2
´=~ ¾2
². The in¯nite sum in Equation (22) has an intuitive interpretation.
Recall from Equations (16) and (17) that following a high signal in Period t, Freddy's forecast of







= ~ ½kG1 ¡ ®(± ¡ ®)k¡1G2 ¡ ½kG¤
1: (23)
The regression coe±cient G¤
1 measures the signal's impact on the true forecast of the state. When
the state is almost constant (¾2
´ small), this coe±cient is small and approximately equal to s2
´=(1¡
½2). Likewise, when ~ ¾2
´ is small, the regression coe±cient G1 under Freddy's model is approximately
equal to ~ s2
´=(1¡~ ½2). Finally, when ® is small, (±¡®)k ¼ ±k. Therefore, the in¯nite sum in Equation
(22) concerns the \term structure" of Freddy's forecast errors as of Period t: it is the sum of squared
di®erences between Freddy's forecast and the true forecast, over all forecast horizons k ¸ 1.10
Figure 1 plots the two forecasts as a function of the horizon k ¸ 1. The thin solid line represents
the true (Tommy's) forecast, which decays at the rate ½k. The thick solid line represents Freddy's
forecast, which is derived by subtracting the e®ect of the gambler's fallacy (represented by the thin
dashed line and decaying at the rate ±k) from the belief in the time-varying state (represented by
the thick dashed line and decaying at the rate ~ ½k). The optimization problem consists in choosing
the parameters ~ ¾2
´ and ~ ½ that characterize the amplitude and decay rate of the belief in the time-
varying state. The objective is to bring the two solid lines as close as possible in terms of the sum
of squared di®erences.
10The de¯nition of e(~ p) in Theorem 1 concerns only the forecast of next period's signal, and not of all future signals.
Because of linearity, however, the forecast error can be broken into independent errors generated by each of the past




´, and ®, the error generated by the Period t¡k signal on the forecast of the Period







Figure 1: E®ect of a high signal in Period t on the forecasts of future signals. The
x-axis represents the forecast horizon k ¸ 1, and the y-axis the forecast of the Period
t + k signal. The ¯gure is drawn for ½ > ±.
Figure 1 con¯rms that Freddy tilts his persistence estimate away from the true value ½ and
towards ±. Indeed, the ¯gure is drawn for ½ > ±, and shows that Freddy's belief in the time-varying
state must decay faster than Tommy's (~ ½ < ½) to better counter the gambler's fallacy. At the same
time, Freddy's belief must have a larger initial amplitude, meaning that Freddy overestimates the
variance.11
Figure 1 reveals the time-pattern of Freddy's forecast errors: Freddy forecasts below Tommy for
short horizons, above for intermediate horizons, and below again for long horizons. This pattern
is, in fact, general, holding also for ½ < ±. The intuition is similar as for our next result, which
concerns Freddy's prediction of a signal that follows a streak of similar signals. To state the result,
we assume that the streak is between Periods t and t0¡1, and all signals in the streak are identical.
Proposition 11 Suppose that ® and ¾2
´ are small, ¾2
´ > 0, ½ = 2 f0;±g, Condition 1 is met, and





















´, i.e., Freddy overestimates the variance.
The intuition why Freddy can underestimate the variance when ½ < ± can be seen graphically as follows. Suppose

















1¡½2, meaning that the thick dashed line is above the thin solid line. Suppose now
that ® is small but ± is close to one, in which case the thin dashed line is close to zero but decays slowly. Then,
Freddy's forecasts are above Tommy's for short horizons (because the thin dashed line is close to zero), and below
for long horizons (because the thin dashed line decays more slowly than all others). If ~ ¾
2
´ is increased, this will
barely reduce Freddy's under-prediction in the long term because the thick dashed line has decayed to zero. Freddy's
over-prediction in the short term, however, will worsen signi¯cantly. Therefore, the sum of squared di®erences can
be reduced by reducing ~ ¾
2
´, meaning that Freddy underestimates the variance.











is negative for t0 = t + 1, becomes positive as t0 increases, and then becomes negative again.
Proposition 11 shows that Freddy under-predicts the next signal after a short streak of high
signals, over-predicts after a longer streak, and under-predicts again after a very long streak. While







Figure 2: E®ect of a streak of high signals on the forecast of the signal following the
streak. The x-axis represents the streak's length, and the y-axis the forecast of the
next signal. The ¯gure is drawn for ½ > ± and the same parameter values as Figure 1.
Figure 2 considers the case ½ > ±. The thin solid line represents Tommy's forecast of the signal
following a streak of high signals, and the thick solid line represents Freddy's forecast. The latter
is generated by Freddy's belief in the increased state (thick dashed line), and his expectation of
a reversal in luck (thin dashed line).12 Because Freddy expects luck to reverse quickly, he under-
predicts the signal following a short streak. The belief in quick reversals, however, leads him to
assume that the reversal following a streak is mainly generated by the streak's last signals, thus
not increasing substantially with the streak's length. On the other hand, Freddy's forecast of the
state increases more substantially with streak length: since he believes that the state mean-reverts
relatively slowly (~ ½ > ±), he assumes that even the early signals in a long streak are informative
about the current state. (In terms of Figure 2, the thin dashed line levels o® faster than the thick
12The thick dashed line is Freddy's forecast when the regression-coe±cient vector G = (G1;G2)
0 is replaced by
(G1;0)
0, and the thin dashed line is the forecast when G is replaced by (0;G2)
0.
23dashed line.) Therefore, after a long streak, Freddy's belief in the increased state overtakes the
gambler's fallacy, leading to over-prediction of the next signal. Finally, Freddy under-predicts after
a very long streak because he underestimates the state's persistence: because the true persistence
is high, Tommy's forecast increases even after very long streaks, overtaking Freddy's.
Figure 3 considers the case ½ < ±. Recall that in this case, Freddy compensates for the gambler's
fallacy mainly by overestimating the state's persistence rather than the variance. Therefore, after
a short streak, his belief in the increased state is not much higher than Tommy's (and can even
be lower when Freddy underestimates the variance). In combination with the gambler's fallacy,
this generates under-prediction. Because Freddy overestimates the state's persistence, however,
his forecast of the state increases faster than Tommy's as the streak gets longer. This generates
over-prediction after a long streak. Finally, because Freddy believes that luck reverses slowly, he







Figure 3: E®ect of a streak of high signals on the forecast of the signal following the
streak. The x-axis represents the streak's length, and the y-axis the forecast of the
next signal. The ¯gure is drawn for ½ < ±.
Proposition 11 makes use of the closed-form solutions derived for small ®. Our numerical results
for general ® con¯rm the under/over/under-prediction pattern of the proposition.
The analysis of prior knowledge has the same °avor as in the i.i.d case. In particular, the results
are identical when Freddy knows the state's persistence parameter (½) but is uncertain about the
extent of time-variation (¾2
´): when ½ > ± ¡ ®, Freddy under-predicts after a short streak and
over-predicts after a longer streak, while the opposite holds when r < ± ¡ ®.
Summarizing, under serially correlated signals, the hot-hand fallacy can arise even when indi-
viduals infer the persistence parameter from the data. In that case, however, our model generates
24under-prediction after very long streaks. Our model has also the general implication that as the
environment becomes more complicated (from i.i.d. to serial correlation), individuals have greater
di±culty to develop the false model that gets them around the gambler's fallacy.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of belief in the gambler's fallacy, and explores the link with the
seemingly opposite bias of the hot hand. We show that an individual who updates rationally except
for the gambler's fallacy tends to overestimate the time-variation of an underlying state. This error,
however, does not always generate a hot hand: in some cases it o®sets the gambler's fallacy, leading
to correct predictions. We show that a hot hand can develop|overtaking the gambler's fallacy|
when the individual knows con¯dently the state's persistence parameter or when signals are serially
correlated. In each case we determine whether the hot hand arises after long or short streaks of
signals.
Our model takes the gambler's fallacy as the only primitive bias. This parsimony allows us to
determine endogenously what other biases arise in a variety of environments and under a variety of
assumptions about individuals' knowledge of the environment. Our model's tractable normal-linear
structure allows the use of recursive-¯ltering techniques, and can provide a °exible framework for
studying the gambler's fallacy in a range of economic and ¯nance settings.
Indeed, we believe that our model's implication that people may come to believe in predictability
even in i.i.d. environments has consequences in a broad range of settings. Consider, for example, a
¯nancial market where returns are i.i.d. Because rational Tommies will eventually learn the i.i.d.
property, they will share a common expectation of future returns. But because Freddies believe that
past returns help predict future returns, they will di®er in their predictions if they observe di®erent
subsets of the return history. Combined with a theory of how trade based on di®erent beliefs
arising from statistical errors might occur, such intrinsic di®erences of opinion among investors
who observe only asset returns could be relevant for understanding the large volume of trade in
actual markets.
More interesting than the implications of \passive observation" are possible implications for
how investors choose to acquire ¯nancial information based on erroneous beliefs about the value
of that information. When Freddy believes that past returns are useful for predicting the future,
he believes technical analysis is useful, even when returns are truly i.i.d. Moreover, he might be
willing to pay for real-time price information, or keep observing prices for the \right time" to enter
or exit a market.13 Perhaps the main implication of \fallacious predictability" is the potential
13Of course, information on current prices is useful whenever an investor's portfolio strategy depends on wealth.
25role in explaining exaggerated belief in ¯nancial expertise. Investors often seem to rely heavily
on the opinions of experts, such as stockbrokers or managers of actively-managed funds. This
seems somewhat puzzling: for example, it is well-documented that actively-managed funds do not
outperform their market benchmarks on average.14 Our model can readily generate a belief in non-
existent expertise. If Freddy falsely believes in predictability but does not have the time to observe
the detailed history of returns, he would treat agents who specialize in observing the market as
useful experts.
Additional implications would follow if Freddies constitute a big enough fraction of a market
as to a®ect prices. Suppose, for example, that the signal consists of a ¯rm's i.i.d. earnings growth,
and Freddies know that ½ > ± ¡ ®. Then, because they will base their investment behavior on
the under-prediction of earnings after short streaks of good news and over-prediction after longer
streaks, expected returns would be high after short streaks and low after longer streaks. This is
consistent with the evidence of short-run momentum and long-run reversals in the stock market.15
Finally, some interesting implications may follow from Freddy's false belief about variance.
When Freddy predicts the signals erroneously, he also overestimates their variance (Proposition 3)
because he attributes his prediction error to signal noise. With i.i.d. signals, the belief in excess
variance arises because of|and, surprisingly, in spite of|a false belief in predictability. Thus,
when returns are truly i.i.d., Freddy can hold both a false belief in predictability and a belief that
the market is excessively volatile. Because of the latter, Freddy can require a high expected return
to enter the market. This could perhaps speak to the equity-premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott
(1985)) that stocks' expected return is high relative to risk.
We believe that the gambler's fallacy may help provide a uni¯ed behavioral explanation for
the diverse phenomena listed above. Moreover, our model and techniques could provide a °exible
framework for pursuing the implications of the gambler's fallacy.
Our point is that investors might be willing to pay for such information for purely speculative reasons.
14This holds both for the performance of the average fund in a given year, and for the performance of a given fund
over time. See Fama's (1991) survey.
15Of course, our model would not make this prediction for all parameter values. For references to the empirical
literature on momentum and reversals, see Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). Our explanation of momentum and
reversals is similar in spirit with the one in BSV, although we rely only on the gambler's fallacy to derive other biases
endogenously rather than the exogenous amalgam of context-speci¯c biases they base their model on.
26A Extensions
A.1 The Case ± < ®
When signals are i.i.d., Freddy cannot get around the gambler's fallacy by developing a belief in a
time-varying and persistent state. Indeed, under such a belief, Freddy would interpret a high signal
as evidence that the state has increased, and would expect future signals to be high. Under the
gambler's fallacy, however, Freddy expects a high signal to be followed by an oscillatory pattern
of low and high signals because ± < ®. These patterns obviously cannot o®set. Formally, the ¯rst
model ~ p1 of Proposition 5 is not feasible because it requires ~ ½ = ± ¡ ®, which is inconsistent with
± ¡ ® < 0 · ~ ½ 2 [0;1). The second model ~ p2 of Proposition 5 leads to correct predictions, and is
the unique model that Freddy converges to. Under this model, the gambler's fallacy is not present
because Freddy attributes all of the signal's variation to the state. Moreover, Freddy assumes that
the state is not persistent (~ ½ = 0), and this leads him to predict correctly that signals are i.i.d.
When Freddy knows con¯dently the value of ½ > 0, he develops a belief in a time-varying
and persistent state. To determine his predictions after streaks of signals, recall from Section 4.2
that when ½ > ± ¡ ®, the gambler's fallacy dominates after short streaks and the hot-hand fallacy
dominates after longer ones. One might conjecture the same to hold when ± ¡ ® < 0 since ½ still
exceeds ± ¡ ®. Our numerical results con¯rm this conjecture when ± ¡ ® > ¡½, i.e., when ± ¡ ®
is not too negative. When ± ¡ ® < ¡½, however, the hot-hand fallacy dominates after streaks of
any length. The intuition is similar as for model ~ p2: Freddy attempts to minimize the e®ects of
the gambler's fallacy by attributing most of the signal's variation to the state. A di®erence with
~ p2 is that Freddy's predictions are incorrect because he takes the state to be persistent. However,
predictions are more accurate than when Freddy attributes most of the signal's variation to luck
because he has di±culty explaining the oscillatory pattern implied by the gambler's fallacy.
When signals are serially correlated, the results have the same °avor. When ± ¡ ® is not too
negative, predictions after streaks are as in Section 5: Freddy under-predicts after a short streak,
over-predicts after a longer streak, and under-predicts again after a very long streak. When ± ¡ ®
is su±ciently negative, however, the ¯rst under-prediction disappears: Freddy over-predicts after
all but very long streaks.
27A.2 Gambler's Fallacy on State Variation
Our formalism can be easily extended to the case where the gambler's fallacy applies to both f²tgt¸1
and f´tgt¸1. Suppose that according to Freddy,




where the shocks ~ ´t are i.i.d. and normal with mean zero and variance ~ ¾2
´. The assumption that ®;±
are common to both f²tgt¸1 and f´tgt¸1 is for simplicity and can easily be dropped. To formulate
the recursive-¯ltering problem, we expand the state vector to
xt ´
h















~ ½ ¡® 0
0 ± ¡ ® 0
0 0 ± ¡ ®
3
5;
wt ´ [~ ´t; ~ ´t;~ ²t]0;
C ´ [~ ½;¡®;¡®];
and vt ´ ~ ´t + ~ ²t. Under these de¯nitions, the analysis of Freddy's inference in Section 3 carries
through identical.






















predicting the signals correctly. This model is very similar to model ~ p1 of Proposition 5: Freddy
gets around the gambler's fallacy by developing a belief in a time-varying and persistent state. The
di®erence with Proposition 5 is that model ~ p2 no longer leads to correct predictions. Indeed, under
that model, the state is i.i.d. and equal to the signal. Under the gambler's fallacy for f´tgt¸1,
however, Freddy expects the i.i.d. state to exhibit reversals.
When Freddy knows con¯dently the value of ½ > 0, he ends up believing that ~ ¾2
´ > 0. Further-
more, when ® is small, ~ ¾2
´ is small relative to ~ ¾2
². Therefore, the e®ects of the gambler's fallacy
for f´tgt¸1 are small relative to f²tgt¸1, and the analysis is the same as when the gambler's fallacy
28applies only to f²tgt¸1. In particular, Freddy's limit beliefs are given by Proposition 7, and his
predictions after streaks by Proposition 8. Moreover, our numerical results con¯rm the patterns of
Proposition 8 for general values of ®.
When signals are serially correlated, we can show as in Proposition 9 that Freddy's predictions
di®er from those of the true model, except in knife-edge cases. When ® is small, Freddy converges to
a model where ~ ¾2
´ is small (and Condition 1 is no longer needed to rule out the small-~ ½ model because
the gambler's fallacy for f´tgt¸1 invalidates model ~ p2). Therefore, the e®ects of the gambler's
fallacy for f´tgt¸1 are small relative to f²tgt¸1, and the analysis becomes identical to the case
where the gambler's fallacy applies only to f²tgt¸1. In particular, Freddy's limit beliefs are given
by Proposition 10, and his predictions after streaks by Proposition 11. Our numerical results
con¯rm the pattern of Proposition 11 for general values of ®, except in a parameter region where
the pattern reverses to over/under/over-prediction. Intuitively, Freddy can over-predict after very
long streaks because his estimate ~ ½ of the state's persistence can exceed both ½ and ±. Freddy
can exaggerate the persistence to compensate for his belief that shocks to the state should exhibit
reversals.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: De¯ne xt and ²±
t as in Section 3.1. Equation (5) implies that Et(xt0) =
AEt(xt0¡1) for t0 > t. Iterating between t0 and t, we ¯nd
Et(xt0) = At0¡tEt(xt): (B.1)
Equation (B.1) implies that Et¡1(²±
t0¡1) = (± ¡ ®)t0¡tEt¡1(²±
t¡1). Therefore,
Et¡1(²t0) = Et¡1(~ ²t0 ¡ ®²±
t0¡1) = ¡®Et¡1(²±
t0¡1) = ¡®(± ¡ ®)t0¡tEt¡1(²±
t¡1):
Proof of Proposition 1: Our formulation of the recursive-¯ltering problem is as in standard
textbooks. For example, Equations (5) and (6) follow from (4.1.1) and (4.1.4) in Balakrishnan
(1987) if xn+1 is replaced by xt, xn by xt¡1, An by A, Un by 0, Ns
n by wt, vn by st ¡ ¹, Cn by
C, and N0
n by vt. Equation (7) follows from (4.6.14), if the latter is written for n + 1 instead of
n, and xn+1 is replaced by xt, xn by xt¡1, and AKn + Qn by Gt. That Gt so de¯ned is given
by Equation (9), follows from (4.1.29) and (4.6.12) if Hn¡1 is replaced by §t¡1, GnG0
n by V , and
Jn by U. Equation (8) follows from (4.6.18) if the latter is written for n + 1 instead of n, Pn is
substituted from (4.1.30), and FnF0
n is replaced by W.
29Proof of Proposition 2: It su±ces to show (Balakrishnan, p.182-184) that the eigenvalues of
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´ + ~ ¾2
²
~ ½±
´ ¸2 ¡ ¸b + c
Suppose that the roots ¸1;¸2 of this polynomial are real, in which case ¸1 + ¸2 = b and ¸1¸2 = c.
Since c > 0, ¸1 and ¸2 have the same sign. If ¸1 and ¸2 are negative, they are both greater than
-1, since b > ¡1 from ® < 1 and ~ ½;± ¸ 0. If ¸1 and ¸2 are positive, then at least one is smaller
















´ + ~ ¾2
²
® > 0;
both ¸1 and ¸2 are smaller than 1. Suppose instead that ¸1;¸2 are complex. In that case, they are
conjugates and the modulus of each is c < 1.
Lemma 3 determines s¤
t, the true mean of st conditional on Ht¡1, and st(~ p), the mean that
Freddy computes under the parameter vector ~ p. These are expressed as a function of the sequence
of orthogonalized signals f³t0gt0=1;::;t¡1, where ³t0 ´ st0 ¡ s¤
t0. This sequence contains the same
information as fst0gt0=1;::;t¡1, but has the advantage that the elements are uncorrelated. Using
Lemma 3, we determine the error e(~ p) ´ limt!1 E¤ [s¤
t ¡ st(~ p)]
2 in Lemma 4. To state both
lemmas, we de¯ne the matrices Dt ´ A ¡ GtC, D ´ A ¡ GC, and
Jt;t0 ´
(Qt
k=t0 Dk for t0 = 1;::;t,
I for t0 > t.
We also use the superscript ¤ for the matrices A, C, G, and § in the recursive-¯ltering problem
under the true model. Finally, for simplicity we set the initial condition x0 = 0.
Lemma 3 The true mean s¤
t is given by
s¤





30and Freddy's mean st(~ p) by





t (¹ ¡ ~ ¹); (B.3)
where











Proof: Consider the recursive-¯ltering problem under the true model, and denote by x¤
t the mean
of xt conditional on Ht. Equation (6) implies that
s¤
t = ¹ + C¤x¤
t¡1: (B.4)















Plugging into Equation (B.4), we ¯nd Equation (B.2).
Consider next Freddy's recursive-¯ltering problem under ~ p. Equation (7) implies that
xt = (A ¡ GtC)xt¡1 + Gt(st ¡ ~ ¹):








Jt¡1;t0+1Gt0(³t + ¹ ¡ ~ ¹ + C¤x¤
t¡1);
where the second step follows from st = ³t + s¤
t and Equation (B.4). Substituting x¤
t0¡1 from






t (¹ ¡ ~ ¹):
Combining this with Equation
st(~ p) = ~ ¹ + Cxt¡1 (B.7)
(which follows from (6)), we ¯nd (B.3).
Lemma 4 The error e(~ p) is given by
e(~ p) ´ lim
t!1
E¤ [s¤






k + (N¹)2(¹ ¡ ~ ¹)2; (B.8)
where














Proof: Lemma 3 implies that
s¤


























t ³t0(¹ ¡ ~ ¹): (B.11)











t )2(¹ ¡ ~ ¹)2: (B.12)























s;t¡k for k = 1;::;t ¡ 1,
0 for k > t ¡ 1.
To determine the limit of
P1
k=0 Ák;t when t goes to 1, we determine the limit of Ák;t for given k












Equation (6) applied to the recursive-¯ltering problem under the true model implies that
¾¤2
s;t = C¤§¤
t¡1(C¤)0 + V ¤:
When t goes to 1, G¤
t goes to G¤, Gt to G, §¤
t to §¤, and Jt;t¡k to Dk+1. Therefore,
lim
t!1





































if there exists a sequence fÁkgk¸1 such that
P1
k=1 Ák < 1 and jÁk;tj · Ák for all k;t ¸ 1. To
construct such a sequence, we note that the eigenvalues of A¤ have modulus smaller than one,
and so do the eigenvalues of D ´ A ¡ GC (Balakrishnan, Theorem 4.2.3, p.111). Denoting by
a < 1 the maximum of the moduli, we can construct a dominating sequence fÁkgk¸1 that decays
geometrically at the rate a2k.
33We next determine the limit of N
¹
t . We can write this as
N
¹
t = 1 ¡ C
t¡1 X
k=1




de¯ning the double sequence fÂk;tgk;t¸1 as
Âk;t ´
½
Jt¡1;t¡k+1Gt¡k for k = 1;::;t ¡ 1,
0 for k > t ¡ 1.


















Âk;t = 1 ¡ C
1 X
k=0
DkG = N¹: (B.16)
The lemma follows by combining Equations (B.12), (B.15), and (B.16).

















To determine the limit of the second term, we note that Equation (6) applied to Freddy's
recursive-¯ltering problem under ~ p implies that
¾2




















































The terms (X;Y;Z) are averages of random variables, and to determine their limits we apply a law
of large numbers (LLN). An appropriate LLN in our setting is that of McLeish (1975) because it
deals with random variables that are non-independent and non-identically distributed. To apply
34McLeish's LLN, we must de¯ne a probability space (­;F;P), a sequence fFtgt2Z of ¾-algebras,
and a sequence fUtgt¸1 of random variables. The pair (fFtgt2Z;fUtgt¸1) is a mixingale (McLeish,
De¯nition 1.2, p.830) if and only if there exist sequences fctgt¸1 and fÃkgk¸0 of nonnegative
constants, with limk!1 Ãk = 0, such that for all t ¸ 1 and k ¸ 0:
kEt¡kUtk2 · Ãkct; (B.20)
kUt ¡ Et+kUtk2 · Ãk+1ct; (B.21)
where k:k2 denotes the L2 norm, and Et0Ut the expectation of Ut conditional on Ft0. McLeish's








almost surely, provided that
P1
t=1 c2
t=t2 < 1 and fÃkgk¸0 is of size ¡1=2. A su±cient condition
for a monotone sequence fÃkgk¸0 to be of size ¡1=2 is (p.831) that
P1
k=1 Ãk < 1.
In our model, we take the probability measure to be the true measure P¤, and de¯ne the
sequence fFtgt2Z as follows: for t · 0, Ft = f­;;g, and for t ¸ 1, Ft is the ¾-algebra generated by
























Equation (B.21) trivially holds since E¤
t+kXt = Xt. To show Equation (B.20), we note that E¤
t Xt =
Xt, and E¤
t¡kXt = E¤Xt = 0 for k ¸ 1 since the sequence f³tgt¸1 is independent. Therefore,








































35We next show that (fFtgt2Z;fYtgt¸1) is a mixingale, where
Yt ´
2³t[s¤




Equation (B.21) trivially holds since E¤


















for k ¸ 1, where the second step follows because s¤
t ¡ st(~ p) depends only on Ht¡1 and thus
is independent on ³t. Therefore, Equation (B.21) holds with Ã0 = 1, Ãk = 0 for k ¸ 1, and









Yt0 = 0 (B.23)
almost surely.
We ¯nally show that (fFtgt2Z;fZtgt¸1) is a mixingale, where
Zt ´
[s¤











Equation (B.21) trivially holds since E¤












where V ar¤ denotes the variance under the true measure P¤. Equation (B.11) implies that
E¤
t¡k[s¤

















[V ar(U1 + U2)]
1
2 · [V ar(U1)]
1
2 + [V ar(U2)]
1
2
















t (¹¡~ ¹)j[V ar¤(³t0)]
1
2 :
Denoting by a < 1 the maximum of the moduli of the eigenvalues of A¤ and D, it is easy to show
36that
Pt¡k






t ¡ st(p)]2¤¤ 1
2 and kE¤
t¡kZtk2. Therefore, we can choose Ãk = Ák and ct = 1.





































almost surely. The proposition follows from Equations (B.17) (B.22), (B.23), and (B.25).










Since from Theorem 1
Lt(Htj~ p)
Lt(Htj^ p)
» exp[t[F(~ p) ¡ F(^ p)]] ! 0;
¼t(~ p) ! 0 almost surely.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider ~ p 2 P such that e(~ p) = e(P) and ¾2
s(~ p) = ¾¤2
s + e(~ p). We
will show that F(~ p) ¸ F(^ p) for any ^ p = (^ ¾2
´; ^ ½; ^ ¾2
²; ^ ¹) 2 P. Denote by ^ § and ^ G the steady-state
variance and regression coe±cient for the recursive-¯ltering problem under ^ p, and by ^ §¸ and ^ G¸
those under ^ p¸ ´ (¸^ ¾2
´; ^ ½;¸^ ¾2
²; ^ ¹) for ¸ > 0. It is easy to check that ¸^ § solves Equation (10) for ^ p¸.
Since this equation has a unique solution, ^ §¸ = ¸^ §. Equation (9) then implies that ^ G¸ = ^ G, and
Equations (B.8) and (B.18) imply that e(^ p¸) = e(^ p) and ¾2
s(^ p¸) = ¸¾2
s(^ p). Therefore,
















Since this function is maximized for
¸¤ =
¾¤2
































where the second inequality follows from e(~ p) = e(P) and the second equality from ¾2
s(~ p) = ¾¤2
s +
e(~ p). The proof of the converse is along the same lines.
Lemma 5 shows that any convergent model must satisfy ~ ¹ = ¹.
37Lemma 5 For all ~ p 2 m(P), ~ ¹ = ¹.
Proof: It su±ces to show that N¹ > 0: Lemma 4 will then imply that if ~ ¹ 6= ¹, e(~ p) can be
reduced by setting ~ ¹ = ¹. From the de¯nition of N¹ it follows that
N¹ = 1 ¡ C(I ¡ D)¡1G = 1 ¡ C(I ¡ A + CG)¡1G:
Replacing A and C by their values, and denoting the components of G by G1 and G2, we ¯nd after
some algebra
1 ¡ C(I ¡ A + CG)¡1G =
(1 ¡ ~ ½)(1 ¡ ± + ®)
[1 ¡ ~ ½(1 ¡ G1)](1 ¡ ± + ®) ¡ ®(1 ¡ ~ ½)G2
:
This is non-zero since ~ ½;®;± 2 [0;1).
Lemma 6 determines when a model can predict the signals equally well as the true model.
Lemma 6 The error e(~ p) is zero if and only if ~ ¹ = ¹ and
CAkG = C¤(A¤)kG¤ (B.27)
for all k ¸ 0.
Proof: From Lemmas 4 and 5 it su±ces to show that fNkgk¸0 = 0 if and only if CAkG =
C¤(A¤)kG¤ for all k ¸ 0. Setting ak ´ C¤(A¤)kG¤ ¡ CAkG and










we can write Nk = ak + Cuk. Simple algebra shows that
uk = Duk¡1 ¡ Gak¡1:












Equation (B.28) implies thatfNkgk¸0 = 0 if and only if fakgk¸0 = 0.
38Proof of Proposition 4: Tommy can achieve minimum error e(P0) = 0 by using the vector of
true parameters p. Since e(P0) = 0, Proposition 3 and Lemma 6 imply that ~ p 2 m(P0) if and only
if (i) ~ ¹ = ¹, (ii) CAkG = C¤(A¤)kG¤ for all k ¸ 0, and (iii) ¾2
s(~ p) = ¾¤2
s . Since ® = 0 for Tommy,
we can write Condition (ii) as
~ ½k+1G1 = ½k+1G¤
1: (B.29)
We can also write the element (1,1) of Equation (10) as
§11 =
(~ ½2§11 + ~ ¾2
´)~ ¾2
²
~ ½2§11 + ~ ¾2










11 + ~ ¾2
´ + ~ ¾2
²
; (B.31)
and the ¯rst element of Equation (11) as
G1 =
~ ½2§11 + ~ ¾2
´
~ ½2§11 + ~ ¾2













where the ¯rst equation in each case is for ~ p and the second for p. Using Equations (B.18) and
(B.14), we can write Condition (iii) as
~ ½2§11 + ~ ¾2






´ > 0, and consider ~ p that satis¯es Conditions (i)-(iii). Equation (B.33) implies
that G¤
1 > 0. Since Equation (B.29) must hold for all k ¸ 0, we have ½ = ½¤ and G1 = G¤
1. We
next write Equations (B.30)-(B.33) in terms of the normalized variables ~ s2
´ ´ ~ ¾2
´=~ ¾2












´) for the same function g, and Equations (B.32), (B.33), and G1 = G¤
1 imply that ~ s2
´ = s2
´.
Equation (B.34) then implies that ~ ¾2
² = ¾2
², and thus ~ p = p.
Suppose next that ½¾2
´ = 0, and consider ~ p that satis¯es Conditions (i)-(iii). If ½ = 0, Equation
(B.29) implies that ~ ½k+1G1 = 0, and Equation (B.34) that ~ ½2§11 + ~ ¾2





the same implications follow because §¤ = 0 and G¤ = [0;1]0 from Equations (10) and (11).
Equation ~ ½k+1G1 = 0 implies that either ~ ½ = 0, or G1 = 0 in which case ~ ¾2
´ = 0. If ~ ½ = 0, then
~ ¾2
´ + ~ ¾2
² = ¾2
´ + ¾2
². If ~ ¾2
´ = 0, then ~ ¾2
² = ¾2
´ + ¾2
². Therefore, ~ p is as in the proposition. Showing
that all ~ p in the proposition satisfy Conditions (i)-(iii) is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 5: We determine the parameter vectors ~ p that belong to m(P0) and satisfy
39e(~ p) = 0. From Proposition 3 and Lemma 6, these must satisfy (i) ~ ¹ = ¹, (ii) CAkG = C¤(A¤)kG¤
for all k ¸ 0, and (iii) ¾2
s(~ p) = ¾¤2
s . Since ½¾2
´ = 0, we can write Condition (ii) as
~ ½k+1G1 ¡ ®(± ¡ ®)kG2 = 0; (B.35)
and Condition (iii) as
C§C0 + V = ¾2
´ + ¾2
²: (B.36)
Suppose ¯rst that G2 6= 0. Equation (B.35) then implies that ~ ½ = ± ¡®. Multiplying Equation
(11) by an arbitrary 1 £ 2 vector v, and noting that vA = (± ¡ ®)A, we ¯nd
vG =
(± ¡ ®)v§C0 + vU
C§C0 + V
: (B.37)
Writing Equation (10) as
§ = A§A ¡ G(C§A + U0) + W;
multiplying by v, and noting that vA = (± ¡ ®)A, we ¯nd
v§ =
£
¡vG(C§A + U0) + vW
¤
[I ¡ (± ¡ ®)A]¡1: (B.38)








(± ¡ ®)vW[I ¡ (± ¡ ®)A]¡1C0 + vU
C§C0 + V
: (B.39)
If v satis¯es vG = 0, then Equation (B.39) implies that
(± ¡ ®)vW[I ¡ (± ¡ ®)A]¡1C0 + vU = 0: (B.40)
Since CG = 0 from Condition (ii), Equation (B.40) holds for v = C:
(± ¡ ®)CW[I ¡ (± ¡ ®)A]¡1C0 + CU = 0: (B.41)
Since CG = 0, Equations (B.36) and (B.38) imply that
CW[I ¡ (± ¡ ®)A]¡1C0 + V = ¾2
´ + ¾2
²: (B.42)
Substituting for ~ ½ = ± ¡ a, A, C, V , W, and U, we ¯nd that the solution (~ ¾2
´; ~ ¾2
²) to the system of
(B.41)-(B.42) is ~ p = ~ p1.
Suppose next that G2 = 0. Equation (B.40) then holds for v ´ (0;1) since vA = (± ¡ ®)v and
40vG = 0. Solving this equation, we ¯nd ~ ¾2
² = 0. The unique solution of Equation (10) then is § = 0,
and Equation (B.36) implies that ~ ¾2
´ = ¾2
´ + ¾2
². Equation (11) implies that G1 = 1, and Equation
CG = 0 implies that ~ ½ = 0. Therefore, p = p2.
Summarizing, the only parameter vectors that can satisfy Conditions (i)-(iii) are ~ p1 and ~ p2.
Showing that ~ p2 indeed satis¯es (i)-(iii) is straightforward. Showing the same for ~ p1 follows by
retracing the previous steps and noting that the term in brackets in Equation (B.39) is non-zero.
Since ~ p1 and ~ p2 are the only parameter vectors to satisfy (i)-(iii), the proposition follows.
Proof of Lemma 2: Equations (6) and (B.1) imply that
Et(st0) = ~ ¹ + CEt(xt0¡1) = ~ ¹ + CAt0¡t¡1Et(xt)






where the second step follows from the steady-state version of (7).
Proof of Proposition 6: Proposition 5 implies that when ½ = 2 f0;± ¡ ®g, e(P½) > 0. Lemma
5 implies that any element of m(P½) satis¯es ~ ¹ = ¹. Therefore, the proposition will follow if we
show that the error e(~ p) is not minimized for ~ s2
´ ´ ~ ¾2
´=~ ¾2
² 2 f0;1g. To compute e(~ p), we note
that the assumption ¾2
´ = 0 generates the following sequence of implications: §¤ = 0, G¤ = [0;1]0,
C¤(A¤)kG¤ = 0 for all k ¸ 0, Nk = ¡CDkG for all k ¸ 0, and





Consider the behavior of e(~ p) at ~ s2
´ = 0. Since § = 0 and G = [0;1]0,














41and CDkG = ¡®±k. Therefore, the derivative of e(~ p) w.r.t. ~ s2
´ at ~ s2




















































The error e(~ p) is not minimized for ~ s2

















the derivative is negative if dG1=d~ s2
´ > 0 and dG2=d~ s2
´ < 0. To show these inequalities, we
di®erentiate Equations (10) and (11), after writing them in terms of ~ s2
´ and S ´ §=~ ¾2
´. Dividing
both sides by ~ ¾2
², we can write Equation (10) as
S = ASA0 ¡
1
CSC0 + 1 + ~ s2
´
£
ASC0 + (~ s2
´;1)0¤£








Likewise, we can write Equation (11) as
G ´
1
CSC0 + 1 + ~ s2
´
£
ASC0 + (~ s2
´;1)0¤
: (B.44)
Di®erentiating Equation (B.43) w.r.t. ~ s2
´ at ~ s2



















(1 ¡ ½2)(1 ¡ ½±)(1 ¡ ±2)
:





1 ¡ ½(± ¡ ®)






(1 + ½®)(1 ¡ ±2) + ±®(1 + ½±)
(1 ¡ ½2)(1 ¡ ½±)(1 ¡ ±2)
< 0:
42Consider next the behavior of e(~ p) at ~ s2
´ = 1. Since § = 0 and G = [1;0]0,
D ´ A ¡ GC =
·
0 ®





0 ®(± ¡ ®)k¡1
0 (± ¡ ®)k
¸
;
CG = ½, and CDkG = 0 for k > 0. The derivative of e(~ p) w.r.t. y ´ 1=~ s2


















The error e(~ p) is not minimized for ~ s2
´ = 1 if the derivative is negative, which is ensured by
dG1=dy < 0 and dG2=dy > 0. To show these inequalities, we write Equations (10) and (11) in
terms of y and Y ´ S=~ ¾2
², and di®erentiate w.r.t. y.
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider a sequence f®ngn2N converging to zero, and an element
~ pn ´ ((~ ¾2
´)n;½;(~ ¾2
²)n;¹) from the set m(P½) corresponding to ®n. The proposition will follow







²)n converges to z and (~ ¾2
²)n converges to ¾2






®n ) by (`´;`²;`s), the point (`´;½;`²;¹) belongs to Tommy's m(P½). (If the
sequences do not converge, we can extract converging subsequences.) Tommy's m(P½) consists of
the unique element (0;½;¾2
²;¹) because only this element belongs in both m(P0) (Proposition 4,
case ¾2
´ = 0) and P½. Therefore, `´ = 0 and `² = ¾2
².
Recall from Proposition 6 that when ~ s2
´ converges to zero, G converges to [0;1]0, CDkG converges
to ¡®±k, and G1=~ s2
´ converges to
1¡½(±¡®)






converges to `v ´ (0;0;¾2
²;`s), CDkG converges to zero and G1=~ s2








½k+1G1 ¡ ®(± ¡ ®)kG2
®



































































and implies `s = z.
Proof of Proposition 8: Equations (B.6) and (B.7) imply that in steady state
st0(~ p) ´ Et0¡1(st) = ~ ¹ + C
t¡1 X
t0=1

































Using Equation (15) to substitute z, we ¯nd






(1 ¡ ½±)(1 ¡ ±)
:
When ½ > ±, the function ¢k is negative for k = 0 and positive for large k. Since it can change sign
only once, it is negative and then positive. The function ¡k is negative for k = 0, then decreases
(¢k < 0), then increases (¢k > 0), and is eventually positive (¡1 > 0). Therefore, ¡k is negative
and then positive. When ½ < ±, the opposite conclusions hold.
Proof of Proposition 9: Suppose that ½ 6= ± ¡ ®, and consider ~ p such that e(~ p) = 0. Lemma 6
implies that for all k ¸ 0, CAkG = C¤(A¤)kG¤, i.e.,
~ ½k+1G1 ¡ ®(± ¡ ®)kG2 = ½k+1G¤
1: (B.48)
44Since ½ 6= ± ¡ ®, Equation (B.48) can hold only if one of (± ¡ ®)k and ½k has a zero coe±cient.
Since ®;½;G¤
1 > 0 (the latter because ¾2
´ > 0), this is possible only if G2 = 0. Proceeding as in
Proposition 5, we can then show that ~ ¾2
² = 0, and thus G1 = 1. Moreover, Equation (B.48) can
hold only if ~ ½ = ½ and G1 = G¤
1, which is a contradiction since ¾2
² > 0 implies G¤
1 2 (0;1).
Suppose next that ½ = ±¡®. We can then proceed as in Proposition 5 to construct ~ p such that
e(~ p) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 10: Lemma 5 implies that ~ ¹ = ¹. Consider a sequence f®ngn2N converging
to zero, and an element ~ pn ´ ((~ ¾2
´)n; ~ ½n;(~ ¾2
²)n;¹) from the set m(P0) corresponding to ®n and
(¾2
´)n = !®n. The proposition will follow if we show that
(~ s2
´)n
®n converges to z, ~ ½n converges to
r, and (~ ¾2
²)n converges to ¾2
². Denoting the limits of ((~ ¾2




®n ) by (`´;`½;`²;`s), the
point (`´;`½;`²;¹) belongs to Tommy's m(P0) (Proposition 4, case ¾2
´ = 0).
Suppose that `½ > 0. Since the only element of Tommy's m(P0) with persistence parameter `½
is (0;`½;¾2












































Since ~ pn minimizes the error e(~ pn), (`½;`s) minimizes the function H(`½;`s). Treating this function
as one in (`½;`s=(1 ¡ `2






























Computing the in¯nite sums, we can write Equation (B.49) as
!½






(1 ¡ `½)2 = 0 (B.51)
45and Equation (B.50) as
!½
(1 ¡ ½2)(1 ¡ ½`½)2 +
1
(1 ¡ `½±)2 ¡
`s`½
(1 ¡ `½)3 = 0: (B.52)
Eliminating `s from Equations (B.51) and (B.52), we ¯nd `½ = r. Substituting into Equation
(B.51), we ¯nd `s = z. Thus, if `½ > 0, the limits (`½;`²;`s) equal (r;¾2
²;z).
We next show that `½ cannot be zero. Suppose, by contradiction, that `½ = 0. Denoting the














































for all (`½;`s). Simple algebra shows that Equations
H(½;!) ¸ Ã























Writing that Nk = 0 for the true model, and subtracting this equation from (B.9), we ¯nd















































For k = 0, the functions ¢0 and ¡0 take the value
¢0 = ¡0 =
zr













r2(± ¡ r)(½ ¡ ±)
(1 ¡ r±)2 < 0;
where the second step follows from Equation (20), the third from (21), and the last because r is
between ½ and ±. A similar calculation shows that
¡1 =
zr






(1 ¡ ½2)(1 ¡ ½)
=
(1 ¡ r)(± ¡ r)(½ ¡ ±)
(1 ¡ r±)2(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ½)
< 0:













rk¢k = 0; (B.53)
¢k has to be positive for some k. Therefore, ¢k is negative, then positive, and then negative again,
because it can change sign at most twice. (The latter is because the derivative of ¢k=½k can change
sign at most once, and thus ¢k=½k can change sign at most twice.)
The function ¡k is negative for k = 0, then decreases (¢k < 0), then increases (¢k > 0), then
decreases again (¢k < 0), and is eventually negative (¡1 < 0). Therefore, ¡k can either be (i)
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